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SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
ACROSS COUNTRIES – IS THE
EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?
MATHIAS M. SIEMS*
Since the beginning of the new century harmonisa-
tion of company law has once again been on the
European agenda.1 Its cornerstone is the 2003
Commission’s Action Plan on Modernising
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate
Governance (COM (2003) 284).This Company Law
Action Plan distinguishes between short-term,medi-
um-term, and long-term actions. The short-term
measures have been adopted or will be adopted
soon, and the Commission has just launched a con-
sultation on the implementation of the medium and
long-term measures.
One of most important aims of the ongoing harmon-
isation is the protection of shareholders. There are
different ways to achieve this.The Draft Directive on
Shareholders’ Rights (COM (2005) 685) will har-
monise some topics in relation to the general meet-
ing. For instance, general meetings are to be con-
vened with at least one month’s notice, share block-
ing will be abolished, and proxy voting will not be
restricted. Conversely, the proposal to change the
European Accounting Directives (COM(2004)725
amending Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC)
focuses on the conduct of the directors. This
Directive will clarify the collective responsibility of
directors for financial publications and introduce
new disclosure requirements (e.g. for related parties
transactions and corporate governance statements).
Finally, the EU Commission has issued two non-
binding recommendations.The first addresses direc-
tors’ remuneration, in particular its disclosure to
shareholders (2004/913/EC). The second recom-
mends that companies appoint independent direc-
tors and set up committees (2005/162/EC).
In discussing these legal instruments, various obser-
vations can be made. For instance, one can focus on
the policy question of whether it is necessary to har-
monise these issues in the EU. In this respect, Siems
(2005a) has already put forward the case against har-
monisation of shareholder rights by means of a new
company law directive. It is also interesting to con-
sider that harmonisation is not the only method of
legal convergence in shareholder law. Siems (2005b)
has,inter alia,suggested that there may be two types
of “convergence forces”: Firstly, as the social, politi-
cal and economic conditions that form the back-
ground to shareholder law come closer together
internationally, the law itself will also grow more
similar (“convergence through congruence”).
Secondly, individual interest groups will press for a
greater approximation of laws (“convergence
through pressure”).
This article focuses, however, on a “leximetric analy-
sis” of the different ways in which shareholders can
be protected.At the outset, it will be explained what
“leximetrics” is. Using this methodology, it will then
be shown how different parts of shareholder protec-
tion have developed in Germany, France, the UK
and US in the last 35 years.
Shareholder protection – Leximetrics 
Usually lawyers follow a qualitative approach
because apart from the citation of statutes or cases
they do not use numbers and do not make calcula-
tions.Leximetrics2 refers to the opposite,namely the
quantitative measurement of law. The problem is,
however, how to do it properly. In particular, when
this quantitative methodology is used to compare
the laws of different countries,one could suggest that
such a “numerical comparative law” approach only
leads to a superficial understanding of different legal
systems (see Siems 2005c and 2005d).
With respect to shareholder protection, the most
famous attempt to quantify the law is the study by
La Porta et al. (1998) on “Law and Finance”. La
Porta et al. used eight variables as proxies for share-
holder protection in 49 countries. These variables
coded the law for “one share one vote”, “proxy by
mail allowed”,“shares not blocked before the meet-
ing”, “cumulative voting”, “oppressed minorities
mechanism”, “pre-emptive rights to new issues”,
“share capital required to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting”,and “mandatory dividend”.In
a second step, they draw on these numbers as inde- * Mathias M.Siems (siems@fulbrightweb.org),Centre for Business
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1 All materials mentioned in the next two paragraphs are available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 2 This term was first used in Cooter and Ginsburg (2003).pendent variables for statistical
regressions. Their main finding
was that good shareholder pro-
tection leads to more dispersed
shareholder ownership, which
can be seen as a proxy for devel-
oped capital markets.
In the last few years many stud-
ies have used the La Porta et al.
variables on shareholder protec-
tion (e.g., Dyck and Zingales
2004; Licht et al. 2005; Pagano
and Volpin 2005). Furthermore,
the EU Commission’s impact
assessment on the Draft
Directive on Shareholders’
Rights explicitly refers to the La Porta et al. study.3
However, it is doubtful whether the findings of La
Porta et al. are accurate.Various studies have identi-
fied numerous coding errors (e.g., Cools 2005;
Braendle 2006; Spamann 2006). But the main prob-
lem is that the limited number of variables hardly
provides a meaningful picture of the legal protection
of shareholders.The choice of variables by La Porta
et al. not only suffers from a US bias but is also a
poor proxy for shareholder protection in general,
because their eight variables do not capture the most
significant aspects of the law (see Lele and Siems
2006 and already Coffee 2001, p. 4).
Lele and Siems (2006) made a fresh start on the
quantification of shareholder protection.We built a
new and, hopefully, more meaningful shareholder
protection index for five countries (Germany,
France, UK, US, and India) and coded the develop-
ment of the law for over three decades. In particu-
lar, we took into account that different legal instru-
ments can be used to achieve a similar function.
This approach made it necessary to extend the
number of variables significantly, namely to 60.
Furthermore, we addressed the various problems
related to the coding of legal provisions. For
instance, we made clear to what extent we coded
non-mandatory and soft law and how we dealt with
ambiguous legal provisions. Subsequently, our
paper gave examples of the interesting possibilities
that diligent quantification of legal rules provides
for comparing variations across time and across
legal systems. For instance, it was found that share-
holder protection has been improving in the last
three decades; that the protection of minority
against majority shareholders is considerably
stronger in blockholder countries and that conver-
gence in shareholder protection has been taking
place since 1993 and increasing since 2001.
The following parts tie in with the Lele and Siems
coding of shareholder protection for Germany,
France, the UK, and the US. The figures shown
below are,however,new.They refer to aggregates of
specific groups of variables, namely legal rules
which are significant for “the active shareholder”,
“the passive shareholder”, and the regulation of
boards. These categories are of particular interest,
because – as mentioned – in all of these three areas
European harmonisation of shareholder protection
is on its way.
The active shareholder
The variables which have been aggregated in
Figure 1 deal with everything which is related to the
general meeting. For instance, these variables code
the powers of the general meeting, the involvement
of the shareholders in its run-up (e.g.,agenda setting,
proxy solicitation, right to call a meeting), voting
rules (e.g., one share one vote, cumulative voting,
supermajority requirements), and individual infor-
mation rights.
In analysing Figure 1, one may suggest that it is no
surprise that Germany and France perform better
than the UK and the US. In the latter countries dis-















Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2006).
LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF THE ACTIVE SHAREHOLDER
measured by an aggregate of 32 variables
Figure 1
3 Impact assessment on the proposal for a directive on the exercise
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persed shareholder ownership is
more common than in Germany
and France. Thus, shareholders
in the UK and US may be “ratio-
nally apathetic” because the
small stakes they hold may not
justify active involvement.
However, the time series reveals
that until the mid-1980s the US
had the best law on the “active
shareholder”. Thereafter the sit-
uation has changed because the
three European countries have
made their law more sharehold-
er-friendly, whereas the US law
has not changed significantly.
This development is also interesting because the
German, French and British law on the “active
shareholder” has improved without European
directives. It can therefore be doubted whether the
Draft Directive on Shareholders’ Rights is really
necessary. This Directive will also not significantly
change the score of the three European countries,
because many of its suggestions already correspond
to the law of the Member States.An exception may
be the right to ask questions at the general meeting.
In this respect,UK company law does not contain a
special right but leaves it to the best practice of
each company (see Siems 2005a, p. 551). The UK
score will therefore improve slightly after the adop-
tion of the Directive. Whether this is a significant
step forward is, however, doubtful because for pub-
lic companies it makes sense to disclose informa-
tion publicly, whereas extensive disclosure at the
general meeting is only a poor substitute (see also
Siems 2006b).
The passive shareholder
The variables of Figure 2 code for the aspects of
shareholder protection that are not related to the
general meeting. For instance, they address the
board structure, duration of directors’ appointment,
directors’ duties and their private or public enforce-
ment, appraisal rights, the mandatory bid, and limits
to amendments of the articles.
These legal rules may be more important than active
involvement of the shareholders. The “rational apa-
thy” of shareholders is often related to the modern
public company with dispersed shareholder owner-
ship (see above). It is, however, by no means a new
phenomenon. Adam Smith already described the
practice as follows: “The trade of a joint stock com-
pany is always managed by a court of directors.This
court,indeed,is frequently subject,in many respects,
to the control of a general court of proprietors. But
the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend
to understand anything of the business of the com-
pany; and when the spirit of faction happens not to
prevail among them, give themselves no trouble
about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or
yearly dividend as the directors think proper to
make to them” (Smith 1776, p. 741).
The awareness of the importance of the rules that
protect the “passive shareholder”can also be seen in
the development of the last 35 years.In all four coun-
tries shareholder protection has increased signifi-
cantly. In particular, the UK score has almost dou-
bled. In contrast to the “active shareholder”, the US
score has also improved considerably in the last few
years,mainly caused by the Sarbanes Oxley Act.This
may, of course, raise the objection that the Sarbanes
Oxley Act is not an actual improvement but “quack
corporate governance legislation with mismatched
means and ends” (Romano 2005). Thus, there is no
escape from admitting the general limit that aggre-
gates of legal variables have. In order to get a deep-
er understanding it is therefore necessary to “open
the box”again and analyse the details of the law.This
is also important for Germany. Although Germany
performs well in Figure 2, its law on the “passive
shareholder” is far from perfect, not least because –
despite recent changes to the law – derivative suits














Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2006).
LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF THE PASSIVE SHAREHOLDER
measured by an aggregate of 28 variables
Figure 2Boards
Figure 3 graphically represents the values of all vari-
ables that deal with boards. It therefore overlaps
with the variables used for Figures 1 and 2. In detail,
Figure 3 takes into account, for instance, the power
of the general meeting to elect directors and to
decide about their remuneration, as well as the rules
on board composition, duration of appointment,
directors’ duties and their enforcement.
The reason for the importance of these provisions
can be based on the reasoning that not the share-
holders but the directors are typically regarded as
the most important body of the company.In the past
the general meeting was generally able to intervene
in the normal operations of the business. At least
since the second half of the 20th century this is no
longer possible. Only in the framework of the ordi-
nary general meeting are shareholders given influ-
ence over “their company”. These developments
have arisen because conducting business by the gen-
eral meeting was regarded as inefficient and also no
longer desired by the shareholders.The efficiency of
the division of powers presupposes that for business
decisions a rapid, informed and expert response can
be made.Since shareholders as a rule cannot manage
this, everyday questions of running the business are
handled autonomously by the firm’s specialised,
expert management. This division also corresponds
to the basic idea of those shareholders who see
themselves primarily as investors. Shareholders in
large public companies want to supply only capital,
not personal commitment, since they lack the inter-
est or the ability to act as managers themselves.4
In Figure 3 it is striking that, in contrast to Figures 1
and 2, the US performs best. But, here again, it can
also be seen that even without European directives
the laws of the three European countries have
improved significantly in the last decades. For a
German lawyer it may, however, be surprising that
the German score is, for the most part, worse than
that of the other countries. Germany is the only
country of the four that has a mandatory two tier
structure, and this division between supervisory and
management board is seen as a key advantage in
monitoring the conduct of business and representing
the firm in the event of conflicts of interest.This has
indeed been taken into account in Figure 3.
However, in other respects the German law is weak-
er than the law of the other countries.This is true,for
example,for the duration of directors’ appointments,
because members can be appointed for up to five
years and dismissal usually requires an important
reason or a high majority.5
Concluding remarks
The discussion of Figures 1 to 3 has shown that
shareholder protection has been improving in the
countries in question in recent decades. This is
notable because it indicates that the involvement of
the EU may not be necessary to strengthen share-
holder protection in Europe.It is further remarkable
that this common development, as well as the differ-
ences between the four countries, does not confirm
the conjecture that there is a division between the
Anglo-Saxon world and Continental Europe.
Although there is more dispersed shareholder own-
ership in the US and the UK,this commonality is not
reflected in the law on share-
holder protection. With respect
to the law, generalisations about
(Anglo-Saxon) common-law
countries and (Continental)
civil-law countries are therefore
doubtful (see generally also
Siems 2006a).
With respect to the differences
between countries, the foregoing
observations have not yet
analysed which parts of the law
are most important for financial


















Source: Based on Lele and Siems (2006).
LEVEL OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
REGARDING THE LAW ON BOARDS
measured by an aggregate of 20 variables
Figure 3
4 On this paragraph, see Siems (2005b) 198–200.
5 For a comparative overview, see Siems
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development. This will, however, be done in the
future. As already indicated in Lele and Siems
(2006), our new indices on shareholder protection
will constitute a basis for an econometric study com-
bining financial data to find statistical relationships
between legal and economic data.
Another point that has not been addressed in this
article is the role of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) for shareholder protection in the EU. In the
last few years there has been increasing activism on
the part of the ECJ in company law matters. This,
however, does not have to do primarily with sub-
stantive law but with questions of conflict of laws
(but see also Gelter and Siems 2005). Here, one can
see the tendency for companies to choose freely
their place of incorporation, a development which is
also fostered by statutory European company law
(see Siems 2004a and 2005f.).If this choice leads to a
“race to the top”– which is a matter of debate – har-
monisation of shareholder protection may also not
be necessary.
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